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The Broken Mirror:
Dissolution of the Subject
and Multiple Personality
Pirandello and Late NineteenthCentury French Psychopathology

Remo Bodei

I

I suggest we consider the genesis of the subject and of its
crisis in contemporary culture starting from a path, not yet
explored and not devoid of surprises, that will take us from scientific and psychopathological models to philosophy and literature.
The distant starting point in the nineteenth century is physiology, and in particular cytology. With the discovery by Matthias
Jacob Schleien and Theodor Schwamm of the cell as the fundamental unit of the organism, and with Rudolf Vierchow' s claim that
1.

[Translatedfrom the Italian by Bruno Martini and Peter Carravetta]
DIFFERENT/A 2 (Spring 1988)

DIFFERENT/A

44

every cell originates from another cell (Omnis cellulaa cellula,1855),
cellular theory becomes the most influential model of explanation
for the phenomena of life. In this context two questions were
repeatedly raised: how does one pass from the monocellular to
the multicellular organisms? And, how do the cells in the multicellular organisms connect and interact among themselves? 1 Such
questions quickly extend beyond physiology and are applied in
an analogous manner to other scientific disciplines [scienze] or
fields of knowledge [saperi].The transition from monocellular to
multicellular organisms is thus interpreted (according to Spencerian models) as an evolution from the simple to the complex, from
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. But since the state of
equilibrium reached by the composites is unstable, the more complex the organism and the more differentiated its cells, the more
it will be exposed to dissolution.For Spencer, dissolution and transience [labilita]make up destiny, be it of organisms as well as of
complex human societies. 2 When an organism or a society is confronted by challenges it cannot resolve since it has not yet achieved
a certain level of evolutionary differentiation, i.e., when it is not
capable of going one step further in its level of complexity, at that
point-since it cannot stand still-it turns back, it breaks up into
simpler and more primitive aggregates. Evolution and dissolution
are complementaryterms: any organism and any society incapable
of development is destined to regress to previously achieved
levels. That which is older-since it is simpler, more elementary,
not composite-is also more persistent and lasting. In other words:
the past is stronger than the present and the future and can thus condition, in a significant though subtle way, the unfolding of organic,
psychic, and social events.
In the field of physiology the transition from the simple to
the complex takes the form of a "crescendo" of coordination among
the various cells which are gradually deprived of their independence and placed under a centralized command. From the cell
qua individual one progresses to more complex organisms. 3
Not surprisingly, legal and political terminology is applied to
physiology even before politics can utilize some of its results. The
power of the single cells, it is said, is "confiscated" in favor of a
"hegemonic" center, whose delegated task is the coordination of
the plurality of cells which are to be assembled in colonies.4 This
holds true not only for the single organisms, but also for the living
creatures that dwell in groups, like the coral polyps, polypesagreges
or corallairesa polypier. These little animals have had the dubious
fortune of becoming for some decades paradigm cases, of provid-
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ing a model used in various ways, as can be seen in Espina's book
Des societesanimales;Etude de psychologiecomparee(Paris, 1877) or
in Perrier' s book, Les coloniesanimaleset la formation des organismes
(Paris, 1881).
In these as well as in various other succeeding works, we see
how each individual of the colony surrenders and confers [deleghi]
its rudimentary functions of "consciousness" to a system of coordination that transcends the single organism. In such fashion a
collective consciousness is generated as tout de coalition,resulting
from the aggregation of a multiplicity of individual consciousnesses which have given up their sovereignty and have placed
themselves under the protection and the control of a central organism. Such a center cannot exist, nor have any autonomy, outside of the system of delegations permitted by the single elements
of which it is composed .
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, this pattern
is applied-with
revolutionary
results-to
the field of
who carried great
psychopathology by three medecins-philosophes,
weight in the culture of their time: Theodoule Ribot, Pierre Janet
and Alfred Binet. Today their names are nearly forgotten by the
general public, but they were famous among their contemporaries
and their books were enormously successful and were sold by
the thousands. Yet traces remain even in contemporary culture,
through the effects which they have directly or indirectly produced: various aspects of the works of Bergson, Sorel, Le Bon,
Freud, Pirandello and Proust would be unthinkable without their
teaching. Theodoule Ribot in Les maladiesde la memoire,Les maladies
de la volonte and Les maladiesde la personnalite,published in Paris
in the years 1881, 1883 and 1885 respectively; Pierre Janet in L'automatisme psychologique(Paris, 1889); and Alfred Binet in Les alterations de la personnalite,which appeared in Paris in 1892,5 contributed, in the field of human psychology, to the overturning of
widespread conceptions of common sense and of well-rooted religious and philosophical traditions. Through their research, the

2.

I, the soul, consciousnessceasesto be a monolithic unit, a simple substance, and becomesan unstable aggregate,an archipelagoof poles of
consciousness,of ilots de conscience, a consciencede coalition" not
unlike that of the coralpolyps.
II

11

II

From the psychological standpoint, the consciousness of individuals considered normal is only the strongest, not the only one.
Its hegemony is based on a coalition, on a system of alliancesand
psychic equilibriumsthat is not natural, but construed, and which
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demands a continuous expenditure of energy. But since what is
most recent and more complex in the evolution of the species is
also the most transient, the "consciencede coalition" not capable of
developing beyond certain levels of greater complexity is liable to
dissolution. Incapable of making progress, it thus falls back onto
more elementary forms of organization. Such assertions bring
about a crucial cultural turning point, a change of paradigm and
a true Gestalt-switchin the way one looks at consciousness and at
the individual. The individual, for example, used to be conceived,
literally, as indivisible, endowed with a soul or a psychic apparatus
similar to a hard kernel, compact, immutable in its essence and,
according to some conceptions of religious derivation, immortal.
The growth of the individual from infancy to a mature age was
in fact understood as an e-ducation,that is, etymologically, a drawing out of what was already implicit in it. Now instead, for the
first time, it is believed that science and experience demonstrate
that the individual is "dividual," divisible and composite.
But another decisive consequence can be drawn from the
preceding premises. What is phylogenetically or ontogenetically
more atavistic or old becomes in fact-according to this modelstronger, firmer and more solid than what is more recent, younger
and hence brittle. Because of this, when the individual is unable
to face up to new and difficult situations, the cerebral cortex (which
phylogenetically is a recent conquest and the seat of the superior
faculties such as intelligence, memory, will) is hit first. And since
for Ribot, following Spinoza, body and soul are nothing but un
phenomeneadoubleface, lesions of the cerebral cortex are responsible
for maladies of the personality, of will and memory. The personality splits into independent and contrasting entities. The whole of
coalitioncrumbles: the sovereign [egemone]consciousness is forced
to abdicateand the federation of souls dissolves. The partial and
multiple consciousnesses resume their autonomy. Thus there
arises mental illness, with a process comparable to a sort of restoration of feudal anarchy, formerly abolished by a centralized
power but which subsequently proved powerless to govern. The
implicit mandate is withdrawn: one regresses to a more archaic system. Put in pathological terms, one is witness to the formation of
split-ups of consciousness on the synchronic as well as diachronic
level, since more than one personality or alternating personalities
are present in the same individual. The stronger consciousness
(which was not the only one) is weakened and extinguished: the
personalities, the wills or the partial memories are not capable of
living together as allies. The psychic apparatus becomes "altered"
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and breaks up into fragments not entitled to grant mandatesinside
that very system, or to form new hegemonic coalitions. In Le Bon's
view the unity of the "I" "is just as fictitious as that of any army" 6
in the sense that, if the general's staff is decimated, the soldiers
turn into bewildered, disoriented stragglers seized by panic.
Nevertheless the split-up of the sovereign personality cannot be
conceived as pure chaos, since "the disorganization organizes
itself" 7 at a less complex level but organized nevertheless. Even
in psychic life, therefore, as in politics, the crises of hegemony
never lead to a vacuum of power, but to a dissolution of the more
complex and unstable ties which, in turn, give rise to psychic
syntheses that are more limited with respect to the ones reached
previously. That which does not fall within the gravitational
sphere of a pole of consciousness is attracted by another or wanders in search of more stable connections in the psychic space of
the sick person .
Yet the alii that are generated from the split-up of the
hegemonic "I" all aspire to an independent life. Not only to a
double view, but to a multiple life. Janet in fact presents the case
of a woman with sixteen different personalities and, in the United
States, Morton Prince, in The Dissociationof a Personality:A BiographicalStudy in Abnormal Psychology(a work tied to the research
of Janet and Binet), analyzes in detail the case of Miss Beauchamp,
endowed with five successive personalities .8 We should recall also
the recent case of Billy Milligham, the first person considered not
guilty of homicide by an American court because under the sway
of twenty-three personalities, of which ten were permanent and
thirteen suppressed. 9
On the basis of these studies in psychopathology and their
circulation among a cultivated but not overly specialized public,
one is led to surmise that the "I" is a fragile construction and that
the subject is in effect-as Levi-Strauss will later say-un pauvre
tresor and an insupportableenfant gate.10 From this perspective, it
seems that for thousands of years Western man has accumulated
only an inflated patrimony and has confined himself to adoring
a tyrannical and demanding idol. One of the strongholds of modern metaphysics is thus threatened: the very bearer of certainty
becomes untrustworthy. If it were possible here to go over even
schematically the centuries-old history of the theme of the centrality of the subject and of its subsequent fall, one would see how
the strategic value of the notion of "subject" is tied to the weakening of the tradition and of the certainties it ushered in. The subject

3.
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can become a witness to truth only in an age-like the modern
one, starting from Montaigne-in which every authority is undermined. Hence the value of the subject does not arise from purely
epistemological reasons but from a crisis in the credibility of the
objectiveworld. As a result the subject transforms itself into an
Atlas and an interpreter of a reality that has lost its power to
persuade immediately. When everything vacillates, one is forced
to seek the wherefore of things and the justifications for events
inside one's own self; one is forced to redefine the basic evidence
and to establish proceduresof intersubjective communication and
a definition of "objectivity," such as can be followed by virtually
everyone so as to reach the same conclusions.
It is just such procedures that-from
Descartes to Kantshape retroactively the subject and thus constitute it, delineating
the field of valid experience and the private sphere. The end-result:
the legislative subject is in reality the product of its own procedures, the guarantor of the structuring of knowing and acting.
But every time attempts were made to see what lies hidden behind
the procedures, so as to reveal the identity of this sovereign [sovrano] ordering agent of the world, it was found that nothing and
no one lay behind. Or, better yet, that it was impossible to individuate this "X", the subject, as Kant had already called it. The
subject makes knowledge possible but it is not knowable; it is, as
Fichte believed, pure activity, but it cannot be intuited. French
culture at the end of the nineteenth century seems to demonstrate
what Schopenhauer had predicted more than half a century before, namely, that by looking within we lose ourselves in a bottomless pit, as if we were in an empty glass sphere. From the inside
of this void, a voice speaks but its cause cannot be found within
the sphere: when we are trying to grasp ourselves, we are only
grasping with horror an inconsistent ghost. 11 Now the credibility
crisis does not just concern the objective world, but hits the subject
as a unitary center, as an ordering agent of the world according
to universal procedures and structures, in its presumably transcendental nature. Failing to find, at the level of mind, any point of
support, the only guarantee of personal identity remains finally
the "consensus" of the bodily organs, their precarious collaboration which produces consciousness, a health always exposed to
sickness and to "degeneration."
French culture, starting with Taine, has especially insisted on
the fragility of the "I", whose activity had been compared to that
of a slave who, in the Roman world, had to cross a circus full of
tired lions and sated tigers yet ever dangerous, with an egg in

REMO BODE/

49

his hand. If he succeeded, he would be set free. 12 Likewise in the
case of the voyage of life the "I" can get to the end unscathed,
but its integrity is a no-guaranteeconquest, since it is just as fragile
as an egg. Put in Freudian terms, one could say that the subject is
no longer master in his own house, but is tolerated, as in Mallarme's
Igitur, only in the guise of simple "guest." Not only has it given
up any pretense of being the guarantor of certainty, but-again
as with Mallarme or with Pirandello's characters-it needs to look
into the mirror to make sure it exists. 13
The Delphic precept "Know thyself," which from Socrates to
Hegel represented the high point of philosophical research, is no
longer tenable and remunerative. To be present to itself is no
longer considered to be a presupposition of truth, and the subject
begins to appear to many as abandoned to "existential drift." 14
Thus, whereas the Hegelian self-consciousness evaded vicious
infinity by returning every time into itself from its relation to
others and could bask in the "Sundays of life" in times of rest
and spiritual relief, at the end of the century it finds that the way
backis blocked.And while Hegel guaranteed the enrichment of the
personality against the dangers and the contradictions that
threatened its integrity by orienting and synchronizing it on the
"North star" of the overall movement of true effectual reality
[Wircklichkeit],now no one believes any longer in the existence of
an objective process of the world endowed with its own sense.
Sense, order, coherence are declared products of the human will,
survival tools of the species.
II
1.
What theoretical strategies can we come up with in the face
of the discovery of the fragility and dissociation of the "I"? How
does one respond to the idea of a radical plurality that's constitutive of the subject? I will here consider three symptomaticanswers:
that of Bergson, that of Nietzsche, and that of Pirandello.The progressively increasing space given to each is due solely to expository
reasons and does not in any way imply a value judgment.
Deeply and most directly tied to the culture of Ribot, Janet,
and Binet, only in Bergson's case do we witness a great effort to
escape the danger of the disintegration of the "I" and to find again
the forgotten way that leads back to it. But this "hearth of identity" -as Ernst Bloch would call it-is difficult to reach, it is a goal
that demands the maximum of spiritualconcentration.For it is easier
to allow oneself to live with a consciousness that is scattered and
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reified, ever exposed to the risk of disgregation and falling into
the ineffectualdesire of other possiblelives.
In fact, the break-up of the "I" into multiple personalitiesis
actually possible for each one of us, for the possible poles of
psychic aggregation have been different throughout our existence
and above all during our formative years. Indeed, in the course
of our life the personality in each one of us has revolved around
certain nuclei, around ilots de consciencewhich, in turn, were subsequently organized into successive coalitions, into archipelagoes
of consciousness.We have often found ourselves at the crossroads,
we have continually discarded possibilities of development in
other directions, we have removed or buried the potential "l's"
that were in the making. Ours has thus been a kind of stalk-like
growth [crescitaa stelo]:every choice has been a victory over alternatives that prior to the decision had still a chance of becoming
actualized.
Every development thus comes about via dissociation,
through alternatives and diremptions, and not just through accumulation or through harmonizing. Our present psyche is like
a tree that preserves the scars of the pruned branches, of the
possibilities that have been cut off. Bergson expresses this concept
quite effectively:
Each one of us, looking back at his own story, can notice that his
personality as a child, indivisible though it was, still combined
within itself different persons which could remain merged because
they were just in the nascent state: this indecision full of promises
is one of the major charms of childhood. But, as one grows, the
personalities within us become incompatible, and since each one
of us lives but one life we are forced to make a choice. In fact, we
do choose constantly and constantly abandon many things. The
road we travel in time is covered with the debris of all that we
started to be, of all that which we could have become. 15

The fact is that-as Ribot, Janet, and Binet taught and as
Pirandello knew very well-in psychic life these choicesand these
exclusions are not definitive. Augustine's in te ipsum rede seems to
come about in the opposite way, that is, it does not lead to the
hearth of personal identity, to interior concentration, but rather
to the rebirth of the plurality of the "I", to dissociation: the abandoned or excluded "I's" come back. As soon as the old monarch,
the sovereign "I" that wanted to rule alone, has become weaker
and has lost its strength, they return from the exile where they
were banished and reinstate their own partial power. In point of
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fact, they are not aliens, they are not strangers: it's rather a matter
of old acquaintances which have been repudiated; acquaintances
all too well known, but consciously or unconsciously ignored which
have generally tried to prove their alterity in dreams or reveries,
for they were often a disturbing [perturbante] presence for
sovereign [egemone]consciousness. Thus they were not something
other from us, for they already were within us, in fact they were
us, except that before they were subordinated to a psychic hierarchy that afforded them little space for independence . When they
reawake, one has the feeling of being possessedby strange powers.
But it is still always us in the plural, in all the different personalities
that can be formed: simultaneously present or alternating, synchronic or diachronic.
There is also a kind of regressivepleasure,a "secondary pay-off"
in living this scission of the personality: the enormous expenditure
of energy necessary to maintain its global hegemonic role stops,
and desires and tendencies that had long been repressed find
release. Other possible lives, back-up lives, get activated;lives that
have remained latent but were never totally erased and which
now contrast with the actual course one's own life has taken .
The aspiration to experiment with parallellives to one's own,
which "normal" personalities satisfy through the reading of novels
or historical works, or by traveling and by means of the imagination, becomes here absolute, freed as it is from any conditioning
and reality principle. Thus, while it is culturally possible to enrich
one's personal identity by living-as if by proxy, "morganatically" -other lives parallel to our own, in the case of the pathological breakdown of the "I" the passion of being others is not directly
linked to the passion for personal growth, or to the desire for
psychic alliances that are more sophisticated and more respectful
of the "otherness" of the colonial "I's." In the case of mental illness
it is not possible to go beyond a determinate level of conflict with
other possible personalities and to resolve it by an increase in
complexity . The single islands of consciousness therefore act separately and the fiction or the ineffectual desire to live several lives
becomes psychic reality . The level of personal identity, no longer
sustained by one unique history of life, is gauged by the degree
of coordination of the organic functions.
Bergson's philosophical strategy can be summed up in the
following two moves: acceptance of the divergentdevelopmenteven
in the area of consciousness and of the subject; a search for the
secret spring from which the unity of spiritual life flows. It's the
current of consciousnessand the elan vital that guarantee in time the
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conservation of personal identity and which sweep in a continuous
flow the fragments of psychic life, tying them together like the
notes of a "melody." With Bergson, the dynamism impressed by
consciousness, the role of memory and the appeal to the phenomenon of
"duration" serve thefunction of exorcisingthe dissolutionof consciousness
into independent entities which are foreign to one another and which
remain "spaced out." The unity of the "I" exists solely with the
flow, with process: if the current slows down, if "the focus on
life" diminishes, then consciousness crumbles and the personality
shatters.
In Nietzsche also the problematic of the plurality of the "I"
is related to that tradition of physiological and psychological research mentioned above. 16
Consequently for him also-and this is a point that must be
emphasized-the
ego is "a multipilcity of forces of a personal
kind, out of which now one now the other come to the fore as
ego, " 17 consciousness is formed by a "multiplicity of consciousnesses, "18 just like the living body in Zarathustra I is "a plurality with
a sense, a war and peace, a flock and a shepherd" and in Beyond
Good and Evil it is "a societal construction of many souls"
[Gesellschaftsbauvieler Seelen).19 Likewise, man is "a plurality of
wills-to-power: each with a plurality of forms and means of expression. " 20 The difference with respect to the other positions we have
considered lies in the fact that for Nietzsche it is the best men,
those endowed with an overabundance of vital force, who are
especially capable of accepting the conflict joyously, of not submitting the plurality of "wills-to-power" and of "l's" which lie in
them to a mortifying and rigid unity. At the summit of the body
as society there is no "absolute monarch," but rather an anonymous and variable force, "the barycenter, something changeable"
[das centrale Schwergewicht . . . etwas WandelbaresJ.21
The hegemonic consciousness is here the result not so much
of relatively stable coalitions, but rather of a continuous displacement toward a temporary point of equilibrium, of the successive
appearance of "forces of a personal kind." One could say that the
disintegration [scindersi]of consciousness or the prevalence of sickness in the body corresponds, more than to a state of anarchy,
to the succession of frequent and sudden displacements of the
center of gravity. This condition, and the complementary one of
the rigidity of the soul and body, seems to correspond the most
to the physical and psychic structure of the mass individual, that
is, of those who know only how to be in the herd and are not
2.

REMO BODE/

53

capable of being both herd and shepherds of themselves, both
plurality and harmonizing, regenerating equilibrium in the tugging of the parts, dissonant harmony. All this because, as can be
gathered from Zarathustra' s speech in Of the Thousand and One
Reasons, the pleasure and the inclination that men feel for the
herd is older-and hence more powerful-than
that which they
feel for the "I." The conquest of an ego or of a self that is relatively
stable is the end-result of a long, painful, and uninterrupted effort
in the history of humanity and of every individual. From such a
conflict still not resolved once and for all arises the continuous
terror of the dissolution of the "I" and the relapse into something
shapeless. It is just such fear that reactively reinforces the idea
and the desire for a monolithic and substantial "I."
Only the esprits forts, those who accept the eternal return,
can escape the collective call of the species and the related fear
of losing themselves should they abandon the herd, the "colony."
They would be capable of taking onto themselves-without
being
destroyed-more persons[mehrerePersonen]and experience the ego
not as an "absolute monarch," but rather as a mobile center of
gravity. At the same time, however, they do not renounce their
selves and are faithful to the end to their own history and to their
own decisions, without being tied to that one exclusive personality
resulting from insecurity and the atrocities of existence. In this
case, to loseoneselfin orderto gain many other "I's" meansmultiplying,
not dividing, one's own powers. The overabundance of vital force,
of "health," even gives rise to the desire for insecurity, for audacity, for the voyage of discovery. In light of these considerations,
3.

the eternal return can be viewed as a strategy to slow down or prevent
the disgregationof personalityand of civilization, the very moment they
areacceptedas the end-productof" decadence."It is a way of unleashing
from the dissolution all the potential liberating effects. It is as if
one would want to refer to oneself, to a multiple identity that
constantly changes and disintegrates, everything that has been
[das Gewesen]by chaining it to repetition. But even to reach such
an end-result, in fact above all because of this, one needs discipline, an aptitude for command and for hegemony (hegemony,
however, which is quite different from that based on "coalitions"
of the "I", modeled, as in Ribot, on parliamentary regimes). The
greater freedom of the "I" depends, in fact, not on a greater
consensusof the parts, but on a harder and cruder hierarchization
of psychic instances that culminate-in the case of the subject-in
the acceptance of the bond of the eternal return. The procedure
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is similar to that practiced by the dancer or the pianist: only by
submitting themselves to the bond of the continuous repetition of
exercisesdo they obtain a greater expressive freedom and a greater
nimbleness of the whole body or of the hands. The powers of
pure scission are thus defeated homeopathically and can no longer
prevail, since the personalidentity is neverthelessreproducedcyclically
within this very multiplicity and disgregation,which are wanted and not
suffered. Thus, there exist no resentments, there are no regrets,
there is no desire to live other parallellives, different from one's own.
With the thought of the eternal return, any desire of being an
other vanishes. The time that it imposes saves and redeems every
instant, making it meaningful.
Paradoxically, it redeems the possibility for something new and
paves the way for it, just like discipline in music and dance makes
creativity possible. Only a few, however, are able to bear "the
greater weight" of the idea of the eternal return. The majority of
men (those adhering to the collective consciousness and those
living ascetically and rancorously with a struggling and divided
soul) realize with barely hidden joy the passage of time that destroys everything and their vindictive spirit takes delight in the
transience of all things. There is, however, according to Nietzsche,
a fundamental difference in the relationship of his contemporaries
to decadence:the man of resentment not only produces it and
accentuates it involuntarily, but he also desires it as punishment
destined to hit everyone, since he is the very first victim. The
"free spirit," instead, desires the decadencebecause he knows that
one cannot go backwards "like the crab" when facing the various
demands of the times. He bends decadencebackonto itself, accepting
it to its ultimate consequences, by curving the parabolaof decline
until it reachesthe circleof the eternal return.
III
1.
Given the fact that Pirandello had gone through painful
private experiences marked by inner turmoil, he was especially
sensitive to the themes put forth by Binet in Les alterations de la
personnalite.22 From his early text Dialoghi tra il "Grande Me" e il
"PiccoloMe" he has notoriously pushed his analyses of the breaking down of the "I" and of the rise of double or multiple personalities to the point of virtuosity. But, while remaining faithful
to the conflicts and aporias that arise from the disintegration of
the subject before oneself and others, he also wanted to explore
the type of road that may possibly take us back to ourselves and
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to render nonconventional forms of identity dramatically acceptable.
The point of departure for any search for meaning here is the
observation that all of us are nailed to parametersof casualreality, a
reality not chosen: "time, space, necessity" and, furthermore,
"fate, fortune, change: all of them traps of life. " 23 We cannot avoid
being what we are, being born and growing up in a certain age,
in a given country, the result of determinate causes or circumstances. We cannot, for example, avoid having a certain nose,
a certain sh.ape.Society chains us to the principle of individuation
because it wants us to be responsible for our acts and our thoughts
(as they prefigure our actions), recognizable as belonging to specific communities. Our every act qualifies us and is ascribedto us as
correspondingto our one and permanent "I", even though we know
quite well that we are not wholly contained in the act that marks
us forever.
In judging man by a single action, no consideration is given
to the struggle among the souls that coexist in every individual (cf.,
for example, the novels L'Ave Maria di Bobbioor Stefano Giogli, uno
e due); a struggle that in certain instances can end up with the
victory of a repressed personality, one judged as socially deplorable and beastly:
Here is a high official who believes himself to be and indeed is,
the poor chap, a gentleman. The moral soul prevails in him. But
one fine day, the instinctive soul that is like a primitive beast lying
hidden deep within each one of us, kicks over the moral soul, and
that gentleman turns thief. Oh, he himself, poor thing, he is the
first to manifest surprise, he cries, desperately asking himself:How, how could you have done this? But, yes sir, he has stolen. And
that other one there? A good man, yes indeed, a very fine man:
yes sir, he has murdered .... 24

Quite rightfully society, from its point of view, condemns these
alterationsof the typical personality and constantly reinforces the
mimetic mechanisms of identity. The moral anathema falls therefore on who has not restrained the "beast" and the desires for
change that, in various ways, are pre-present in the "brain," an
organ which is defined-in a letter of the nineteen-year-old Pirandello--as: "the mysterious depths of the sea populated with monstrous thoughts that flash and dart dangerously about."
In accepting us into its bosom, society gives us an identification tag, a name that already contains a story and that must stabilize
us into a role, transform us into one individual. But the name,
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and the permanent "I" that it should help build, are suitable only
for dead things, not living creatures:
A name is nothing else but an obituary epitaph. It is suitable for
the dead, for those who are finished. I am alive and am not finished.
Life is not over . And Life knows nothing of names either. 25

The name is but one of the many mechanisms in the production
of the personality. The personality and the "I" are a construction,
whereby eachone takes some materialfrom him/herselfand builds him/
herself. For Pirandello, as for Vico, verum ipsum factum: "we can
only know what we can give form to." 27 The fact is, however,
that each one gives form to himself and others in a different way.
With similar assertions Pirandello does not invent a literary topos:
he is already in tune with the most advanced literary and
philosophical culture of his time. His are not baroque paradoxes,
but epistemological problems that are vigorously debated and
which arise from the premise according to which there exist no
objective, ontologically guaranteed reality. Our every knowledge
of the world is a construction or-in Marchesini' s language-a
fiction. In itself "reality" is an unknowable limit, and, of itself,
devoid of sense. Only our abstractions, in fact, give meaning to
the world. But to abstractions there corresponds nothing more
than our will to construct, the poietic act that creates them. That
·entails, however, that they also be fragile, arbitrary, and not
guaranteed by any recognized moral or religious authority (God
has not died, according to Pirandello, but has aged and become
impotent, as we read in "The Aged God" contained in his Tales
for a Year). Human history is in danger of becoming again that
tower of Babel to which Yahveh had, mythically, imposed law
and order.
To give oneself form and to emerge from the indistinct means
to commit oneself to a form that organizes and structures. But
behind every form there is a force, more or less intense:
The reality that I attribute to you is embedded in the form that you
give me; but it is a reality for you and not for me, the reality that
you have for me is contained in the form that I give you; but that
is what reality is for me and not for you. As for myself, I have no
other reality than the form that I succeed in giving myself. How
so? But precisely in constructing myself. Ah, you believe that we
build only houses right? I build myself continuously, and you do
likewise. And the construction lasts as long as the cement of our
will holds up and until the material of our sentiments crumbles.
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And do you know why such insistence on will and constancy of
sentiments? If one wavers but slightly, the other changes also minimally and good-bye reality of ours! We immediately realize that it
was nothing but our own illusion. Hence firmness of will, constancy
of sentiments . Be strong so as not to dive into the void, so as not
to encounter these unpleasant surprises. But what beautiful constructions come out! 28

Illusions are abandonedconstructions that no longer correspondto any
present sentiment or will and that are no longer kept together by any
"cement." Consequently, the personalityis all the more lasting the less
the materialof our sentiments "crumbles"and the more constant is our
will to preservethem unaltered.
Every form is both an anchorof salvationand a stock, a principle
of individuation but also a condemnation to individuation. Being
must be "entrapped" in its form as long as the form resists and
must adapt to it. This entails, however, paying a price for it. 29
But there are moments when even this anchor of salvation cannot
hold up in the face of life's tempests, manifesting its fictional
nature. Life and reality are in fact an indistinctflux that only for convenience's sake do we subdivide into parts and place under the rule of
abstractions. We are not talking here of the Bergsonian flux of
consciousness, or of William James' stream of consciousness,or of
a purifying bath of every slag, but of a kind of infernal and primitive river, of ruinous flood-wavesthat sweep away the "houses"
that we have so laboriously erected:
Life is a continuous flux that we laboriously try to arrest to fix into
stable and determinate forms, inside and outside of us, because
we already are fixed forms! Forms that move in the midst of other
motionless forms which, however, in following the flux of life, tum
gradually more and more rigid, as the movement slows down and
stops. The forms that we try to stop and fix within us in this
continuous flux are the concepts, the ideals which we try to stick
to, all the fictions that we create, the conditions, the kind of state
into which we try to settle. But within us, in what we call the
"soul" and which is the life within us, the flux continues, indistinct,
underground, beyond the limits that we impose putting together
a consciousness, constructing a personality. At certain stormy moments, all these fictitious forms of ours miserably fall as they are
hit by the flux: and even what does not flow underground and
over the banks but which is distinct to us and which we have
carefully channeled in our affections, in the duties we have imposed
on ourselves and in the habits we have developed, can sometimes
tum into a flood and overwhelm us. There are restless souls almost
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in a continuous state of fusion who refuse to set, to become rigid
in this or that form of personality. But even for more sedate souls,
those who have settled into one form or another, fusion is always
possible: the flux of life is in everyone. 30

This rich passage has a parallel in a page from One, No One,
One Hundred Thousand:
It's well that you tap your ears so as not to hear the terrible clangor
of a sure underground robbery, beyond the limits which you, like
a good judge, have staked out and made yours in putting together
your most scrupulous consciousness. They can collapse, you know?
In a stormy moment like the one Ms. Anna Rosa has had. What
robbery? Oh well, is it that of high tide, your Honor? You have
channeled it well in your affections, in the duties you have imposed
on yourself, in the habits you developed. But then there come
moments of flood-tides, your Honor, and the river overflows its
banks and overwhelms everything. I know it. All is submerged for
me, your Honor! I dove in and now I am swimming in it, I am
swimming in it . And if you only knew how far away I am already!
I almost can't see you anymore. 31

Constructing oneself is a "spontaneous interior artifice, the
fruit of secret tendencies or of unconscious imitation." 32 Notice
the oxymoronic expression spontaneousartifice:the construction of
· identity is spontaneous insofar as it is unconscious and the product
of the forces of social conditioning, but it is artificial in that it does
not correspond to any normatively binding and rigid human nature. Each one taken in and of itself is nothing, is no one:
Do you want to be? There's this to ponder: in the abstract one is
not. Being needs to be entrapped into a form and end up in it for
some time, here or there, such and such .33

We shouldn't ignore, incidentally, Pirandello's native soil and his
hometown customs and traditions. Agrigento is the birth-place
of Empedocles, the philosopher of metamorphosis and of the
cosmic conflict between neikos and philia. Agrigento is also near
Lentini, the classical Leontini, the town of the Sophist Gorgias,
who was capable of proving anything and its contrary. And it is
indeed the "feeling for the contrary" [sentimentodel contrario]that
characterizes humorism 34 and more generally all of Pirandello's
art. Vitangelo Moscarda is precisely the one
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willing to think and feel also the contrary of what he was thinking
and feeling just a while ago, that is, break up and dismantle every
mental and sentimental formation by constant and contrary
reflections. 35

These are the people more likely to experience the discovery of
the illusions, more capable of chipping away the cement of the
will and of throwing into disarray the various sentiments, of shaking the unconscious construction that stems from imitation and
the crystallized images that the others have formed of us.
When this spontaneity and animal innocence of the construction going on (as with ants or termites) is discovered, then everything crumbles and it becomes possible to see the "unformed,"
the chaosfrom which every form rises as order or protection against
it. So whether we have the "restless souls in an almost continuous
state of fusion," or the quiet ones "who have settled into one form
or another" but who are shaken by some event that alters them,
they all come to a point where they are forced to abandon every
vital fiction. We come thus to the moment of confession:
In certain moments of interior silence, during which our soul sheds
all of its habitual fictions and our eyes become more acute and
penetrating, we see ourselves within life, and life in itself, as if
barren, disturbing [inquietante] nakedness: we are seized by a
strange impression, as if, in a flash, a reality different from the one
we normally perceive were revealed to us, a living reality beyond
human sight, outside the forms of human reason. Then most lucidly
the whole context of daily experience, almost suspended in the
void of this interior silence of ours, appears to us devoid of sense
and pointless; and that different reality will seem to us horrible,
in its almost impassive and mysterious crudity, since all of our
fictitious, concrete relations of sentiments and images have broken
down and dissolved in it. The internal void widens, crosses the
limits of our body, becomes emptiness around us, as if time and
life stood still, a strange void, as if our interior silence would sink
sweeping down into the abyss of mystery. With a supreme effort
we try then to reacquire the ordinary consciousness of things, to
re-establish with them the usual relations, to re-connect the ideas,
to feel alive as before, as always. But we can no longer have faith
in this normal consciousness, in this usual feeling of life, because
we already know that it is one of our tricks for living and that
underneath it all there is something else, which man can approach
only at the risk of dying or going crazy. It was just a second, but
its impression stays long with us: a dazzling and eerie quality which
contrasts the stability, yet so vain, of things: ambitious or miserable
appearances. Life, then, meandering casually and miniscule among
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these appearances, seems no longer real to us, appearing rather
like a mechanical phantasma?ory. Now how do you give it importance? How give it respect? 3

This great passage would call for a word-by-word comment.
But for now at least two apparently marginal points have to be
kept in mind. The first is that Pirandello employs the language
of mysticism for the profane discovery of a dimension "that man
can approach at the risk of dying or going crazy." He speaks of
a sudden revelation, "in a flash," of a "different reality," "of a
strange void," of a standstill of time and of life: all of them images,
sensations and ideas which are common in the mystical ecstasy,
in which the temporal flux is suddenly suspended and in the great
void one becomes aware of the "numinous," the terrific. The
second point relates to the slight importance of life and to the
difficulty of paying it "respect" once the illusion is discovered.
This is an element that gives an ambiguous character to all of
culture, even the political one, during the turn of the century,
divided as it was between the vitalistic cult of existence and the
attraction toward death, torn between the pietas toward living
things and pleasure, destruction and self-destruction.
What is one to do after the deception has been discovered,
. after a crack however minimal (the crooked nose of Vitangelo
Moscarda, for example) is found in our "house," in our "spontaneous artifice"? A great part of Pirandello's work seems to revolve
obsessively around this topic with a constancy and an insistence
which lasted for decades, ranging from his earliest writings to the
time of his death. After all it is not just a matter of a semiotic or
esthetic problem, but of an entire sequence of existential questions:
"I was not a person I was a bunch of personalities [personaggi}*
in search of a person," Pirandello would confess. 37
In the face of such discovery one can react basically in two
ways (unless one is able to accept acritically the Jamesian Will to
Believe and become quickly attached to other illusions once the
preceding ones have fallen by the wayside). One way would entail
not being anyone, that is, to use a term coined by Louis Dugas,
"depersonalization," in being "as you want me." One then looks
at oneself in the mirror, which is the recurrent metaphor for the
otherness and foreignness of the identical [dell'alterita e dell'estraneita
dell'identico]. One sees oneself as the stranger before him, the
impossible experiment of looking at oneself as the others would
2.

*Personaggiomeans both "personality" and "character." [Tr.)
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and do look at us (impossible because one would need an infinite
number of mirrors, each of which would give a different image). 38
Emptied of the sentiment of belonging, what is each individual?
"Nothing. Nobody. A poor mortified body, waiting for someone
to take it." 39 This is the way, in its negative view, of dying while
living, this is the path that becomes the destiny of the many people
who lower the threshold of their expectations for meaning and
happiness in life to the point that, fearing further wounds and
humiliations, prefer rather the interior void even before physical
death. 40 But the horrible river, which sweeps away our construction, is life itself, life that cannot be frozen, cannot be "set" without
dying innermost. When, in fact, one's own vital current is congealed,
each one feels oneself inexorably assimilated to one's own principle of individuation, and transformed into an actor that recites a
routine role. Without enthusiasm, and lessened to a "marionette"
fashioned by both himself and others, the actor now looks at
himself living. 41 It will then seem as if all that is happening around
him has already happened (as in the psychological phenomenon
of dejavu, symptom of a breakdown of personality under way)
or that he himself is another person, a stranger, as in the short
story "The Nail," in which the protagonist unintentionally kills a
red-haired girl in New York with a nail that he had casually picked
up in some street in Harlem.
Pirandello had closely and personally experienced this disturbing impression of seeing oneself live from the outside, like
an automaton, and had felt already in his youth the acute sense
of dejavu. 42 He in fact confessed later on that it often happened
to him that when faced with people and landscapes seen for the
first time, he knew against all evidence of having encounteredthem
long before:"I have always recognized everything." 43
The second way of confronting the discovery of the senselessness and illusion of the forms of life consists in practicing the
heroicfuror of Vitangelo Moscarda, that is, in not wanting to be a
nobody, a ghost projected from the images of others or an ephemeral, spontaneous construction of oneself. This way entails wanting to be one, but without a name; oneself,not like the others forge
us, conditioning us, but like one wants to be once and for all:
naked masks, divested, a la St. Francis so to speak, of all the
external frills, of all the vanities and the illusions that no longer
help us to live . The Pirandellian characters-like the protagonist
of the novel When I Was Crazy, who deprives himself of all his
goods and reads The Little Flowersof St. Francis 44 -find an authentic dimension only in the knowledge that it is necessary to reject
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the unceasing flow of illusions. Paraphrasing Max Weber, one
can say that Pirandello here suggests a kind of this-worldly-asceticism [ascesiintramondana].
To choose for oneself means rejecting the common criteria of
identification (name, space, time, cause), but it also means putting
oneself outside human fellowship, it means being declared crazy
or irresponsible, wearing a rattle-cap [berrettoa sonagli], or being
ostracized and condemned to solitude. Alternatively, as in the case
of the Il Fu Mattia Pascal, one can change one's own name and
reconstruct a new identity for oneself. After discovering the illusions of identity, Vitangelo Moscarda declares: "I was becoming
'one.' I. I who now wanted to be thus. I who now felt thus.
Finally!" 45 But he quickly perceives the ice of solitude, which is
due not so much to the fact of being deprived of the company of
others, but rather to being deprived of a non-ephemeral(one) self.
Even in company one can "founder" in the other's solitude. 46
To whom can one thus turn saying "I"? What center and
point of reference is one to take?
When touching me, when shaking my hands, yes, I was saying
"I" but to whom was I saying it to? And for whom? I was alone.
Alone in the whole world. Alone for myself. And then a shiver
that shook me to the roots of my hair, I felt eternity and the chill
of this infinite solitude. To whom was I to say "I"? What did it
mean to say "I" if for the others it had a sense and a value that
could never be mine? As for me, so much outside of the others,
to embrace a value or a sense means to plunge immediately into
the horror of this void and of this solitude. 47

Now one is no longer filled-as in When I Was Crazy-with
the other "I's" that had been internalized:

all

When I was crazy I did not feel myself, which is tantamount to
saying: I was not living in my house. I had, in fact, become a hotel
open to all. And if I would hit my head a little, I would feel that
there was always people lodged in there [.... ] I could not say I,
within my consciousness, for immediately an echo would resound:
I, I, I, . . .. spoken by all the others. It was like having an aviary
within me. 48

Vitangelo Moscarda is no longer his own guest as in a hotel, but
is now master in his own house, which, however, is empty, at least
initially.
And yet to be truly one, so as not to have regrets over the
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preceding sclerotized "I", one needs to be many, "one hundred
thousand." One has to rid oneself completely of every rigid form,
of any inelastic determinacy whatsoever. In this case, uncertainty
is the shelter, existential as well as economical uncertainty (to sell
everything, to give everything away, and even to let oneself be
robbed, as the Pirandellian "idiot" sometimes does):
This uncertainty within me which shied away from every limit,
from every support, and would pull back almost instinctively from
every consistent form like the sea pulls away from the shore [ ... ] .49

Well, this uncertainty must be tolerated, because-besides
being
horrible-it is also liberating for those who can rise up to the
perspective of its heights or, according to common sense, its absurdities.
But what is the essence of such a possible strategy of "liberation"? It consists in fusing and renderingfiuid the determinationsof
consciousness,in abandoningevery rigidprincipleorcriterionof individuation, in losing oneselfso as to find oneself, in letting oneselfgo and in
foundering, in de-centeringand in savoring the pleasureof not having
to laborto construct oneselfany more:
Ah, to be no longer conscious of being, like a stone, like a plant!
Not to remember any longer even one's own name! Lying down
here on the grass, with the hands crossed behind one's head, to
see the blue sky with dazzling, sunfilled white clouds sailing along;
to hear the wind up there, among the chestnut trees, roaring like
the sea. [ ... ] Ah to lose oneself there, to lie down and abandon
oneself, yes, in the grass, in the silence of the sky: to fill your soul
with all that vain blueness, letting every thought, every memory
founder! 51

Even Dianella in The Old and the Young experiences briefly this
tendency toward a panic fusion with nature, this serene and yet
at the same time disturbing losing of the self:
The surrounding silence was so astonishing and so intense and
thoughtless was the day-dreaming of the earth and of all things,
that she gradually felt attracted and fascinated by it. Absorbed in
their perennial dream, some trees seemed to her burdened with
an infinite and resigned sadness from which the wind was trying
in vain to shake them . She perceived, in that mysterious intimacy
with nature, the rustling of leaves, the humming of the insects,
and she no longer felt she was living for herself: she lived for a
moment almost unconsciously, with the earth, as if her soul had
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become "fused" with and "con-fused" by all the things of the countryside.52
The beauty of the countryside
it we are outside the city,

depends

on the fact that when in

away from a constructedworld: houses, streets, churches, squares
are constructed, not just in the traditional sense, but also because
one no longer lives just for the sake of living, like these plants,
without knowing that one lives. Rather, we live for something that
does not exist and that we put there; a something that gives sense
and value to life: a sense, a value that here, at least in part, you
can manage to lose, or recognize as distressing vanity . And you
turn languid and, yes, melancholic. I understand, I understand.
Relaxation of the nerves. A deep need of letting go. You feel a
loosening, you abandon yourself. 53
This de-concentration of the will from policing the "borders"
and from the need of a rigid identity can also be perceived as a
conversion(rather than a reinforcement) of the will itself. One need
not then construct oneself once and for all and defend this illusion
and this phantasm with a disproportionate expenditure of energy
relative to its initial advantages. All one has to do is find a will
that utilizes one's energy to construct and reconstruct oneself
continuously, that does not literally erect palaces but, as it were,
ever-mobile tents, that it build not buildings but ships, that it not
enclose itself within the inexorable "prison of time" 54 which destroys the eternal seeking more than that which wants to be only
temporary. In short a will that creates time from one instant to
the next, after having suspended its course in the terribleinstant of the
discovery of the vital illusions. Only then can personality be born
and be able to transform itself continuously, peacefully, in its
apparent anomaly and folly, savoring the freshness of being born
and dying at every moment. Thus, symptomatically, ends One,
Nobody, One Hundred Thousand, with Vitangelo Moscarda who asks
to be locked up in the home for the old he had himself founded,
after having relinquished all his belongings:
The home for the old rises in the countryside in a most delightful
place. I go out every morning at dawn, because I now want to keep
my spirit so, dawn-fresh, with all the things as they just open up,
that savor still of the raw of night, before the sun dries up their
moist breath and dazzles them. Those water-filled and leaden
clouds hanging heavily and piled up over those pale mountains
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that make that green patch of sky still in the shadow of night appear
larger and clearer. And here these blades of grass, they too tender
with water, the living freshness of the banks. And that little donkey
in the open all night, looking about with foggy eyes and snorting
in the silence so close to him and which slowly seems to vanish as
everything around comes into the clear with light beams striking
the deserted and stunned fields. And the air is new. And everything, moment by moment, is what it is, something coming alive
so as to show itself [che s'avviva per apparire]. 1 immediately turn
my eyes so as not to see anything more stop in its appearing and
die. Only this way I can live, then. Reborn from moment to moment.
Preventing thought from starting to work within me again and
re-establish the void of vain constructions. The town is far away.
Sometimes, in the calm of the sunset, the sound of bells reaches
me. But now those bells I no longer hear within me but outside,
pealing for themselves, perhaps vibrating with joy in their ringing
cavity, against a beautiful blue sky filled with warm sun, between
the chirping of swallows or in the cloudy wind, heavy and so high
on those lofty towers. Thinking of death, praying. There are those
who have still need of this, and the bells speak for them. I no
longer have this need because I die every instant, I do and I am
born anew and without memories: living and whole, no long~r in
me, but in everything outside. 55

3.
The highest level of liberation that the Pirandellian character
is capable of reaching is the loss of a rigid memory and of projecting
and constructing thought. Only thus can his experience-after
the dissolution of the illusions-rebirth at every instant and experience life as a perpetual "dawn." With such choices he avoids
reflecting on death as the end of everything, because everything
dies ceaselessly so as to renew itself, because that which does not
have a definitive form can well undergo metamorphoses,but never
be completely destroyed. Only in this way can it enjoy the coming

aliveof appearanceand beableto transformillusionfrom a baroquesymbol
of transienceinto a splendidiridescenceof phenomena,in the silent yet
expressive voice of all being. The price is high: voluntary segregation from the social context, a regression from all the conquest of
civilization (in the double sense of the city and of citizenship,
insofar as pertaining to a human fellowship), a desire to no longer
live within oneself, a "vegetal" need-symptomatically
acute also
in D' Annunzio-of
becoming plants or stones and to tum one's
back on consciousness.
The supreme theoretical virtuosity consists here again in

changing the signs of the transienceand disgregationof consciousness,
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in accepting them together as instruments not of pain and laceration, but rather of a joy that is not of this civilization or at any rate
contrary to every rule of human co-existence. One accepts decadence
in its most disturbing nucleus in the idea that at the basis of
everything there is primitive andfrightening chaos,which one cannot
look at-as if a Gorgon or a Medusa head-"without
dying or
going crazy." The consequence is thus drawn that all forms, all the

structures of order, are stratagems,artificialconstructionsof civilization
producedby the animal man, for whom it is necessaryto believein order
to live, but on which-once put on guard by some collective or
individual trauma-one
can no longer seriously put faith in.
If this principle is admitted-which
looked at retrospectively
turns out to be, for us, the most profound assumption that is
common to the entire culture we have examined-we
usher in
every project attempting to give meaning to a world that has been
declared to be constitutionally without it, a potent corrosive,a nihiliswithin these premtic generatorof entropy. That is why-staying
ises-one can escape in the various ways, among others, we have
examined: Bergson's solution of overtakingin time [batteresul tempo]
the forces of dissociation, reinforcing the dynamic unity of consciousness in its flow and channeling, through memory and the
elan vital, whatever tends to scatter. Nietzsche's solution of saying

yes to life and wanting ourselveseternallyin the splendorof appearances,
in the "greatmidday." Or Pirandello's solution of adhering substantially to the "feeling of the contrary" and to the varied and detailed
analysis of the struggle of souls present in each individual. Pirandello alludes to forms of conciliation which presuppose, from an
artistic point of view, a departure from society and the mystical
dimension, but which are ever ensnared by an unconcealed attraction for that infernal current the sight of which can make one die
or go crazy.
It is a whole culture that experiences the setbackof the principle
of individuation, a principle whose mechanism appears jammed,
no longer capable of offering to the individual a network of meanings with which to orient himself. Le Bon used to say that the
revolutions that begin are nothing more, in reality, than beliefs
that have ceased. 56 What ceases here is the belief in the naturalness
and stability of the "I", and, also, for a great number of people,
the belief in an eternity beyond the time of one's individual life.
The search for meaning, which religion projected into an infinite
duration, becomes now problematically contracted in the most
sensitive expressions of contemporary consciousness: the individual discovers a death, a pain, a sickness, a loss of meaning not
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ransomed by any sort of remuneration. The distinction between
time and eternity being abolished, time appears now as irrevocable
destruction and eternity like a mystical instant of suspension of
time which one would like to prolong forever even though fully
aware of the futility of his effort. So as to exit from such a mournful
state of mind and to restore "dignity" to life and meaning to
existence, one experiments thus with various ways of escaping.
Besides those we have considered here, one may recall,
among others, the rebirth of Platonic realism in mathematics, in
logic, and in the philosophy of essences [Wesenheiten]ofRussell
and Husserl toward the end of the nineteenth century and the
first decades of our century. Or the restoration of ontology (for
example, Nicolai Hartmann, Heidegger, and the late Lukacs) as
an attempt to give consistence to "being," to rekindle the trust in
the event [Ereignis]which is not "imperscrutability" or chaos, and
finally the attempt to rid "becoming" of its irremediably horrendous character . From this perspective hermeneutics itself seems
like a controlledconsummation of tradition, a slow fading of the apparati of sense . By means of a de-constructionor of the Verwindung,
hermeneutics too seeks, in fact, to extract energy from the dissolution of the previous ties, of surviving with whatever remains of
a collapse. And with our present-day projects focused on the
redistributionof sense, we are still feeling today, in small doses, the
after-effects of this shock.

1. For a general picture of physiology and cytology in the nineteenth century, cf. M. Klein, Histoire des origines de la theorie cellulaire (Paris, 1936); R.
Watermann, Theodor Schwamm. Leben und Werk (Diisseldorf, 1960); M. Florkin,
Naissanceet deviation de la theoriecellulaire,in La connaissancede la vie (Paris, 1967),
pp. 43-80; W. Coleman, Biology in the Nineteenth Century. Problemsof Form, Function, and Transformation(Cambridge, 1971); H. Grunze-A.Q.I. Spriggs, History of
Clinical Cytology: A Selectionof Documents (Darmstadt, 1983), 2nd. ed.
2. From 1851-52 onward Spencer generalized von Baer's idea according to
which every organism develops by passing from a structural homogeneity to a
structural heterogeneity. In 1857, with the essay Progress:its law and cause, and
in succeeding works, he adds to such a conception the idea of the instability of
the homogeneous and of the dissolution which represents the complementary
destiny of every evolution.
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3. On the cell as Individuum cf. M.J. Schleiden, Beitriigezur Phytogenesis,
in "Archiv fur Anatomie, Physiologie und wissenschaftliche Medicin," 1838, p.
137; Th. Schwamm, MikroskopischeUntersuchungen iiber die Uebereinstimmungin
der Struktur und dem Wachstumer Thiere und Pflanzen, Berlin, 1839, p. 2. It was F.
Le Dantec, in La definition d'individu, in "Revue Philosophique de la France et
de l'Etranger," XXVI, 1901, t. LI, pp. 13-35, 151-172, who demonstrated that the
thesis which identified the cells with the protozoa and defined the organism as
an aggregate of more individuals was false. The property of being individual is
independent from the simple or complex structure of organism and is tied to a
total morphological and hereditary unity. Thus collapse, from a purely 'scientific'
point of view, the concepts behind multiple individuality .
4. It was the liberal Vierchow who applied political metaphors to the field
of cytology, such as that of the organism as a society or federation of cells or
free State; cf. Cellular-Pathologie,in "Archiv fur pathologische Anatomie und
Physiologie und fur klinische Medicin," VIII (1855), p. 25; Alter und neuer Vitalismus, ibid., IX, 1856, p. 35; Die Kritiker der Cellularpathologie,ibid., XVIII, 1860, p.
9. See also, R.G. Mazzolini, Stato e organismo, individui e cellulenell'operadi Rudolf
Vierchow negli anni 1845-1860, in "Annali dell'lstituto storico italo-germanico in
Trento / Jahrbuch des italienisch-deutschen historischen Instituts in Trient," IX
(1983), pp. 153-293.
5. On the work of Theodoule Ribot, cf. R. Lenoir, La psychologiede Ribot
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